Microsoft Research

Friends Don't Let Friends Deploy Black Box Models: The Importance of Intelligibility in Machine Learning

Rich Caruana



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Accuracy vs. Intelligibility Tradeoff ???



Accuracy vs. Intelligibility Tradeoff – No Longer True for Tabular Data



Accuracy vs. Intelligibility Tradeoff – No Longer True for Tabular Data





Table 1: Test set AUCs across 10 datasets. Best number in each row in **bold**.

Glace	Roy			0 00 110								
Ulassi	GAM				Full Co	mplexity						
		EBM	EBM-BF	XGB	XGB-L2	FLAM	Spline	iLR	LR	mLR	RF	XGB-d3
	Adult	0.930	0.928	0.928	0.917	0.925	0.920	0.927	0.909	0.925	0.912	0.930
	Breast	0.997	0.995	0.997	0.997	0.998	0.989	0.981	0.997	0.985	0.993	0.993
	Churn	0.844	0.840	0.843	0.843	0.842	0.844	0.834	0.843	0.827	0.821	0.843
	Compas	0.743	0.745	0.745	0.743	0.742	0.743	0.735	0.727	0.722	0.674	0.745
	Credit	0.980	0.973	0.980	0.981	0.969	0.982	0.956	0.964	0.940	0.962	0.973
	Heart	0.855	0.838	0.853	0.858	0.856	0.867	0.859	0.869	0.744	0.854	0.843
	MIMIC-II	0.834	0.833	0.835	0.834	0.834	0.828	0.811	0.793	0.816	0.860	0.847
	MIMIC-III	0.812	0.807	0.815	0.815	0.812	0.814	0.774	0.785	0.776	0.807	0.820
	Pneumonia	0.853	0.847	0.850	0.850	0.853	0.852	0.843	0.837	0.845	0.845	0.848
	Support2	9.813	0.812	0.814	0.812	0.812	0.812	0.800	0.803	0.772	0.824	0.820
	Average	0.866	0.862	0.866	0.865	0.864	0.865	0.852	0.853	0.835	0.855	0.866
	Rank	3.70	6.70	3.40	4.90	5.05	4.60	8.70	7.75	9.70	7.40	4.10
	Score	0.893	0.781	0.873	0.818	0.836	0.810	0.474	0.507	0.285	0.543	0.865
			7									

Chang, C.H., Tan, S., Lengerich, B., Goldenberg, A. and Caruana, R. "How Interpretable and Trustworthy are GAMs?" KDD2021



"We observed that the best interpretable models can perform approximately as well as the best black-box models(XGBoost)"

Wang, C., Han, B., Patel, B., Mohideen, F. and Rudin, C., 2020. In Pursuit of Interpretable, Fair and Accurate Machine Learning for Criminal Recidivism Prediction. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2005.04176*.

Model	COMPAS	MIMIC-II	Credit Fraud
Logistic Regression	0.730 ± 0.014	0.791 ± 0.007	0.975 ± 0.010
Decision Trees	0.723 ± 0.010	0.768 ± 0.008	0.956 ± 0.004
NAMs	0.741 ± 0.009	0.830 ± 0.008	0.980 ± 0.002
EBMs	0.740 ± 0.012	0.835 ± 0.007	0.976 ± 0.009
XGBoost	0.742 ± 0.009	0.844 ± 0.006	0.981 ± 0.008
DNNs	0.735 ± 0.006	0.832 ± 0.009	0.978 ± 0.003

Table 1: AUC on the classification datasets for different learning methods. Each cell contains the mean AUC \pm one standard deviation obtained via 5-fold cross validation. Higher AUCs are better.

Table 2: RMSE on regression datasets for different learning methods. Each cell contains the mean RMSE \pm one standard deviation obtained via 5-fold cross validation. Lower RMSE is better.

Model	California Housing	FICO Score
Linear Regression	0.728 ± 0.015	4.344 ± 0.056
Decision Trees	0.720 ± 0.006	4.900 ± 0.113
NAMs	0.562 ± 0.007	3.490 ± 0.081
EBMs	0.557 ± 0.009	3.512 ± 0.095
XGBoost	0.532 ± 0.014	3.345 ± 0.071
DNNs	0.492 ± 0.009	3.324 ± 0.092

Agarwal, R., Melnick, L., Lengerich, B., Frosst, N., Zhang, X., Caruana, R. & Hinton, G.E., *Neural Additive Models: Interpretable Machine Learning with Neural Nets*, NeurIPS 2021.

EBMs: Generalized Additive Models (GAMs)

Linear/Logistic Regression



GAMs/EBMs



BlackBox Machine Learning



- Interpretable
- Not very accurate
- Can't model nonlinearities
- Can't model normal in middle
- Sometimes gets sign wrong!

- More interpretable than linear/logistic
- Can be very accurate
- Can model nonlinearities
- Can model normal in middle
- More likely to show important effects
- Invented by Hastie & Tibshirani 1980's

- Not interpretable (blackbox)
- Can be very accurate
- Can model nonlinearities
- Can model normal in middle
- More likely to learn spurious effects

EBMs: Generalized Additive Models (GAMs)



Example 1: Pneumonia Mortality

Pneumonia Dataset (collected 1989): 46 Features

Patient-history findings Age (years) Gender A re-admission to the hospital Admitted from a nursing home Admitted through the ER Has a chronic lung disease Has asthma Has diabetes mellitus Has congestive heart failure Has ischemic heart disease Has cerebrovascular disease Has chronic liver disease Has chronic renal failure Has history of seizures Has cancer Number of above disease conditions Pleuritic of chest pain

Physical examination findings
Respiration rate (resps/min)
Heart rate (beats/min)
Systolic blood pressure (mmHg)
Temperature (°C)
Altered mental status (disorientation, lethargy, or coma)
Wheezing
Stridor
Heart murmur
Gastrointestinal bleeding

Laboratory findings Sodium level (mEq/l) Potassium level (mEq/l) Creatinine level (mg/dl) Glucose level (mg/dl) BUN level (mg/dl) Liver function tests (coded only as normal* or abnormal) Albumin level (gm/dl) Hematocrit White blood cell count (1000 cells/µl) Percentage bands Blood pH Blood pO₂ (mmHg) Blood pCO₂ (mmHg)

Chest X-ray findings Positive chest X-ray Lung infiltrate Pleural effusion Pneumothorax Cavitation/empyema Lobe or lung collapse Chest mass

Age	=>	-0.23
Asthma	=>	-0.15
Glucose	=>	+0.18
Albumin	=>	+0.01
Blood pH	=>	+0.38
Respiration	=>	+0.21
Creatinine	=>	-0.01
BUN	=>	-0.21

$$Score = baseline + \sum_{i=0}^{n} f_i(variable_i)$$

$$\mathsf{POD} = \frac{1}{1 + e^{-Score}}$$

Age	=>	-0.23
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What EBMs Learn about Pneumonia Risk vs. Age



Fix Age > 100 Problem (Enforce Monotonicity)



Original Model is Correct for Actuarial Use



- · Model correctness (and accuracy) depends on how model will be used
 - This is a good model for health insurance provides
 - But needs to be repaired before using for patient treatment decision
- A few things intelligible model learned:
 - · Beware of jumps at round numbers --- almost always due to human/social/policy effects
 - Asthma => lower risk
 - History of chest pain => lower risk
 - History of heart disease => lower risk
 - Obstructed airway => lower risk



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 - Beware of jumps at round numbers --- almost always due to human/social/policy effects
 - Asthma => lower risk
 - History of chest pain => lower risk
 - History of heart disease => lower risk
 - Obstructed airway => lower risk
 - Model is rewarded with high accuracy on test set for predicting these things!
- Important: Must keep potentially offending features in model!
 - Let model become as biased as it can be
 - $\cdot\,$ Then delete or edit terms after seeing what model learned

Intelligibility Can Create New Medical Science



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Intelligibility Can Create New Medical Science



Can save 2500 lives per year in U.S. alone

Rich Caruana

Treatment Effects Ubiquitous in All Medical Data



Pairwise Interactions?

Like XOR (parity), interactions can't be modeled as a sum of independent effects: $f(b_1) + f(b_2) \neq f(b_1, b_2)$



Pairwise Interaction: Age x Cancer (Pneumonia-95)



Example 2: ICU Mortality

Intelligibility Helps Debug Data: PaO2/FiO2 Ratio



Intelligibility Helps Debug Data: PaO2/FiO2 Ratio



Intelligibility Helps Debug Data: PaO2/FiO2 Ratio


Intelligibility Has Completely Changed How We Think About and Handle Missing Values

Example 3: Housing Price Data



Housing Pricing Data

ExplainableBoostingRegressor_4 [6]



Housing Pricing Data

In [74]:

df_filt[df_filt['YearBuilt'] == 1989].sort_values('SoldPrice', ascending=False)

executed in 83ms, finished 00:52:17 2020-08-14

Out[74]:

	SoldPrice	NEW House Type	NEW Zipcode	Bedrooms	Bathrooms	HouseSizeSqm	LotSizeSqm	YearBuilt	New City
58799	8094000	Condo/Coop/Timeshare	98136	1	1.00	50.91	1375.93	<mark>1</mark> 989	Seattle
58798	8094000	Condo/Coop/Timeshare	98136	1	1.00	50.91	1375.93	1989	Seattle
58797	8094000	Condo/Coop/Timeshare	98136	1	1.00	48.31	1375.93	1989	Seattle
58789	8094000	Condo/Coop/Timeshare	98136	2	2.00	70.98	1393.17	1989	Seattle
58788	8094000	Condo/Coop/Timeshare	98136	2	2.00	70.61	1393.17	1989	Seattle
58787	8094000	Condo/Coop/Timeshare	98136	2	2.00	66.89	1393.17	1989	Seattle
58786	8094000	Condo/Coop/Timeshare	98136	1	1.00	47.94	1375.93	1989	Seattle
53120	1940000	Single Family	98102	4	3.00	318.66	340.68	1989	Seattle

Example 4: Wikipedia Malicious Edits



Wikipedia/Wikimedia

- 160,000 edits per day, 10-15% of which are flagged as damaging (e.g., malicious)
- \cdot Current ML tools are not intelligible, do not give help or explanations to editors



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Impact on Real Policy



Wikimedia Policy @wikimediapolicy

Replying to @wikimediapolicy

Re: algo. transparency, MSFT's Rich Caruana gives an example of glass box methods: "You see a decrease in malicious editing [of Wikipedia] at 30 days because that is when [it] automatically logs you out. If you remember your password, you're less likely to do malicious editing."

7:18 PM · Jul 30, 2020 · Twitter Web App



FOUNDATION

•

• Overall, Wikipedia protected about **2,000 election-related pages**. Restrictions were put in place so that many of the most important election-related pages, such as the main page about the U.S. 2020 Presidential Election, could be edited only by the most trusted and experienced Wikipedia editors.

The Economist

...

"For America's recent presidential election, editing articles was restricted to accounts more than 30 days old, and with at least 500 edits ..." – The Economist, Jan 7th 2021

Example 5: Severe Maternal Morbidity

Pregnancy & Severe Maternal Morbidity (SMM)

- SMM: predicting maternal risk during labor in NTSV population:
 - Hemorrhage or need for blood transfusion
 - \cdot Thromboembolism
 - · Hysterectomy
 - · Eclampsia

•

- Before our work, the main risk factors for severe maternal morbidity (SMM) were:
 - Maternal hypertension (pre-eclampsia)
 - · Maternal diabetes
 - · Maternal obesity

Rich Caruana, Ben Lengerich (CMU), Vivienne Suiter M.D. (FHCQ)

•

Intelligible ML Says Most Important Factors Are...



Joint work with Ben Lengerich CMU/MIT), Vivienne Souter (FHCQ)



Joint work with Ben Lengerich CMU/MIT), Vivienne Souter (FHCQ)

Example 6: Cancer Treatment

Cancer Mortality Risk vs. Age

Age Enrollment



Zheng Zhang, Ying Xiao M.D., Sang Ho Lee (University of Pennsylvania), Rich Caruana (Microsoft)

Cancer Mortality Risk vs. Age

Age Enrollment



Zheng Zhang, Ying Xiao M.D., Sang Ho Lee (University of Pennsylvania), Rich Caruana (Microsoft)

Cancer Mortality Risk vs. Age

Age Enrollment



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Rich Caruana

Example 7: COVID-19 Mortality

COVID-19 Mortality Risk vs. Age



Ben Lengerich (CMU/MIT), Rich Caruana (Microsoft), Aphinyanaphongs Yindalon (NYU)

Rich Caruana

COVID-19 Mortality Risk vs Gender



Ben Lengerich (CMU/MIT), Rich Caruana (Microsoft), Aphinyanaphongs Yindalon (NYU)

Surprising Discovery: Lymphocytes_Absolute_a



Joint work with Aphinyanaphongs Yindalon (NYU)

0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00 1.25 1.50 1.75 2.00 Mortality Odds Ratio

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Mortality Risk from Comorbidities and Out-patient Meds

Peptic ulcer disease (110) Platelet Aggregation Inhibitors (186) Valve Replacement (448) Diabetes with chronic complications (612) Sex (Female) (1815) Cerebrovascular disease (616) Renal disease (859) Mild liver disease (337) Vitamin D Preparations (139) Peripheral vascular disease (620) Rheumatoid Arthritis (999) Metastatic solid tumour (137) Laxatives And Cathartics (118) Diabetes without chronic complications (1258) Calcium Channel Blocking Agents (154) Statins (342) Hemiplegia or paraplegia (134) Anticonvulsants (109) Chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (865) Afibrillation (772) Analgesic/antipyretics, non-salicylate (110) Proton-pump Inhibitors (150) Cancer (any malignancy) Beta-adrenergic Blocking Agents (136) Hypertension (633) Antihyperglycemic, Biguanide Type (126) Dementia (337) Congestive heart failure (618) Beta-Adrenergic Agents, Inhaled (147) Myocardial infarction (830)

Mortality Risk from In-patient Meds

Direct Factor Xa Inhibitors (257) Antacids (116) Ketorolac (122) Ibuprofen (97)	
Antihypertensives, Vasodilators (138) Electrolyte Depleters (118) Calcium Channel Blocking Agents (740) Benign Prostatic Hypertrophy/micturition Agents (332) IV Solutions: Dextrose-saline (128) Selective Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitor (SSRIS) Thiazide And Related Diuretics (111) Magnesium Salts Replacement (434) Alpha/beta-adrenergic Blocking Agents (274) Alpha/beta-adrenergic Blocking Agents (258) Platelet Aggregation Inhibitors (999) Cardiovascular Diagnostics-radiopaque (503) Beta-adrenergic Blocking Agents (719) Beta-adrenergic Blocking Agents (719) Potassium Replacement (842) Heparin And Related Preparations (1112) Sodium/saline Preparations (1913) Anti-coagulant Full Dose (246)	
Azithromycin (1833) Vitamin D Preparations (224) Loop Diuretics (396) Analgesic/antipyretics, non-salicylate (2507) Pineal Hormone Agents (240) Expectorants (606) Copioid Analgesics (348) Antihypertensives, Ace Inhibitors (208) Proton-pump Inhibitors (208) Proton-pump Inhibitors (681) Hydroxychloroquine (1499) Leukotriene Receptor Antagonists (90) Antipsychotic, atypical, dopamine, serotonin Antagnst (111) Laxatives And Cathartics (661) Ietracycline Antibiotics (164) Beta-adrenergic And Glucocorticoid Combo, Inhaled (244) Glucocorticoids (704) Anti-anxiety - Benzodiazepines (119) Beta-Adrenergic Agents, Inhaled (727) Anticholinergics, Orally Inhaled Short Acting (365) Iv Solutions: Dextrose-water (160) Miotics And Other Intraocular Pressure Reducers (117) Vancomycin Antibiotics And Derivatives (332) Vitamin C Preparations (316) Analgesic/antipyretics, Salicylates (214) Non-opioid Antitussive And Expectorant Combination (84) Cephalosporin Antibiotics - 3rd Generation (281)	
-	-0.10-0.05 0.00 0.05 0.10

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Glucocorticoid Steroids



Joint work with Ben Lengerich (CMU) & Aphinyanaphongs Yindalon (NYU)

Differential Privacy via EBMs



Harsha

Nori

MSR Aether













High Accuracy, Perfect Interpretability, Strong Privacy



Comparison of DP-EBM with DP Logistic Regression and DP Boost. Average AUROC of 25 folds of cross validation at varying privacy guarantees.

Editing Unwanted Bias

- Differential privacy can introduce noise and unwanted bias
 - Is 80 less risky than 77 and 82?
- Bias will impact minorities more
 - Impossibility Results in Fairness + DP: [Cummings, Gupta, Kimpara, Morgenstern]
 "We show that it is impossible to achieve both differential privacy and exact fairness while maintaining non-trivial accuracy"
 - Intuitively makes sense need more noise to protect smaller populations.



Risk of Dying

Editing Unwanted Bias

- Differential privacy can introduce noise and unwanted bias
 - Is 80 less risky than 77 and 82?
- Bias will impact minorities more
 - Impossibility Results in Fairness + DP: [Cummings, Gupta, Kimpara, Morgenstern]
 "We show that it is impossible to achieve both differential privacy and exact fairness while maintaining non-trivial accuracy"
 - Intuitively makes sense need more noise to protect smaller populations.

We can fix this!



Monotonicity for Free

Optimal Monotonicity via Postprocessing: Pool Adjacent Violators Algorithm (PAV)



Align ML Model Behaviors with Human Users' Knowledge

NeurIPS Research2Clinics Workshop: Best Paper Award



Jay Wang

Georgia Tech



Alex Kale University of Washington



Harsha Nori Microsoft



Peter Stella NYU Langone Health



Mark Nunnally NYU Langone Health



Polo Chau Georgia Tech







Rich Caruana Microsoft Research

Mickey Vorvoreanu Jenn Wortman Vaughan Microsoft Research Microsoft Research Microsoft Research



NAMs: Neural Additive Models Interpretable Machine Learning With Neural Nets

Rishabh Agarwal, Levi Melnick, Ben Lengerich, Nicholas Frosst, Xuezhou Zhang, Rich Caruana, Geoffrey Hinton



Differential Privacy and Interpretability in Causal Modeling

CLEAR '22: Oral Presentation *****









Harsha Nori

MSR Aether



Brian Quistorff

> Bureau of Economic Analysis





	MCD A
	MIST AI



Donald Ngwe Office of Chief Economist



Rich Caruana

Summary

- Every dataset has flaws
 - \cdot Every time we apply glass-box ML to a new dataset we find these kinds of problems
 - High accuracy not sufficient --- models are rewarded with high accuracy for predicting wrong things
 - · Without intelligibility and explanation you're flying blind --- that's dangerous!
- Glass-Box ML models like EBMs and NAMs give you the tools to need:
 - \cdot To understand, vet and edit your model before using it clinically
 - Learn from your data to improve healthcare
- EBMs & NAMs are currently the most accurate glass-box learning methods available
 - Easy to use open-source package: github.com/interpretml/interpret
 - Can now train glass-box EBM models just as easily as XGBoost, GBT, RF, ...
 - If you work in healthcare, don't use linear/logistic regression --- they're not accurate and they lie!

InterpretML

Open-Source Tool for Intelligibility

github.com/interpretml/interpret

Microsoft Research

Thank You!



© Microsoft Corporation.

Algorithm Sketch


Iteration	feat ₁	feat ₂	feat ₃	•••	feat _n
1					

Iteration	feat ₁	feat ₂	feat ₃	•••	feat _n
1	\checkmark				

Iteration	feat ₁	feat ₂	feat ₃	•••	feat _n
1	\sim	res			

Iteration	feat ₁	feat ₂	feat ₃	• • •	feat _n
1	× -	res			

Iteration	feat ₁	fea	at ₂	feat ₃	• • •	feat _n
1	\checkmark		res			

















Iteration	feat ₁		$feat_2$		feat ₃		• • •		feat _n	
1	\checkmark	res	\checkmark	res	\checkmark	res		res	\checkmark	res
2	\checkmark	res	\checkmark	res	\sim	res		res	\checkmark	res
3	\sim	res	\checkmark	res	\checkmark	res		res	\checkmark	res
4	\checkmark	res	\checkmark	res	\checkmark	res		res	\checkmark	res
5	\checkmark	res	\checkmark	res	\checkmark	res		res	\checkmark	res
6	\checkmark	res	\checkmark	res	\mathbf{k}	res		res	\checkmark	res
7	\checkmark	res	\checkmark	res	\checkmark	res		res	\checkmark	res
8	\checkmark	res	\checkmark	res	\checkmark	res		res	\checkmark	res
 10,000	\checkmark	res	\mathbf{k}	res	\checkmark	res		res	\checkmark	res

feat ₁		feat ₂		feat ₃		•••		feat _n	
\checkmark	res	\checkmark	res	\checkmark	res		res	\checkmark	res
\checkmark	res	\checkmark	res	\checkmark	res		res	\checkmark	res
\sim	res	\checkmark	res	\sim	res		res	\checkmark	res
\checkmark	res	\checkmark	res	\checkmark	res		res	\checkmark	res
\checkmark	res	\checkmark	res	\checkmark	res		res	\checkmark	res
\checkmark	res	\checkmark	res	\checkmark	res		res	\checkmark	res
\checkmark	res	\checkmark	res	\checkmark	res		res	\checkmark	res
\checkmark	res	\mathbf{k}	res	\checkmark	res		res	\mathbf{k}	res
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Iteration	feat ₁	feat ₂		feat ₃		•••		feat _n	
1		\checkmark	res	\checkmark	res		res	\checkmark	res
2		\checkmark	res	\checkmark	res		res	\checkmark	res
3		\checkmark	res	\checkmark	res		res	\checkmark	res
4		\checkmark	res	\checkmark	res		res	\checkmark	res
5		\checkmark	res	\checkmark	res		res	\checkmark	res
6		\checkmark	res	\checkmark	res		res	\checkmark	res
7		\checkmark	res	\checkmark	res		res	\checkmark	res
8		\checkmark	res	\checkmark	res		res	\checkmark	res
 10,000		\checkmark	res	\checkmark	res		res	\checkmark	res



Iteration	feat ₁	feat ₂		feat ₃		•••		feat _n	
1		\checkmark	res	\checkmark	res		res	\checkmark	res
2		\checkmark	res	\sim	res		res	\checkmark	res
3		\checkmark	res	\checkmark	res		res	\checkmark	res
4		\checkmark	res	\checkmark	res		res	\checkmark	res
5		\checkmark	res	\checkmark	res		res	\checkmark	res
6		\checkmark	res	\checkmark	res		res	\checkmark	res
7		\checkmark	res	\checkmark	res		res	\checkmark	res
8		\mathbf{k}	res	\checkmark	res		res	\checkmark	res
 10,000		\checkmark	res	\checkmark	res		res	\checkmark	res
	Transments of the second secon								

Iteration	feat ₁	feat ₂	feat ₃	•	••	feat _n	
1			\checkmark	res	res	${\searrow}$	res
2			\checkmark	res	res	\checkmark	res
3			\checkmark	res	res	\checkmark	res
4			\checkmark	res	res	\checkmark	res
5			\checkmark	res	res	\checkmark	res
6			\checkmark	res	res	\checkmark	res
7			\checkmark	res	res	\checkmark	res
8			\checkmark	res	res	\checkmark	res
•••							
10,000			\checkmark	res	res	\checkmark	res

Iteration	feat ₁	feat ₂	feat ₃	•••		feat _n	
1			\checkmark	res	res	\checkmark	res
2			\checkmark	res	res	\checkmark	res
3			\checkmark	res	res	\checkmark	res
4			\checkmark	res	res	\checkmark	res
5			\checkmark	res	res	\checkmark	res
6			\checkmark	res	res	\checkmark	res
7			\checkmark	res	res	\checkmark	res
8			\checkmark	res	res	\checkmark	res
 10,000			\checkmark	res	res	\checkmark	res
		At a manufacture of the second s		+	+		

$feat_1 \qquad feat_2 \qquad feat_3 \qquad \dots \qquad feat_n$













How to Fit Pairwise Interactions ?

- $\cdot\,$ FIT MAINS:
 - Fit main effects first
 - Freeze the main effects
 - Compute residual of main effects to original targets
- \cdot FIT PAIRS:
 - There are O(N²) possible pairs --- don't want to add that many terms to model
 - Use algorithm called FAST to heuristically sort $O(N^2)$ pairs by match to residual
 - · User selects number of pairs to add to model
 - Run same round-robin boosting algorithm to fit K pairs
- \cdot Final Model = N Mains + K Pairs

	Pair ₁	Pair ₂	Pair ₃	• • •	Pair _n
Iteration	f _a f _b	$f_{c} f_{d}$	$f_e f_f$	• • •	$f_x f_y$

	Pair ₁	Pair ₂	Pair ₃	•••	Pair _n
Iteration	$f_a f_b$	$f_c f_d$	$f_e f_f$	•••	$f_x f_y$
1	\checkmark				

	Pair ₁	Pair ₂	Pair ₃	• • •	Pair _n
Iteration	f _a f _b	$f_c f_d$	$f_e f_f$	•••	$f_x f_y$
1		25			









	Pair ₁		Pair ₂		Pair ₃		•••		Pair _n	
Iteration	$f_a f_b$		$f_c f_d$		$f_e^{} f_f^{}$		• • •		$f_x f_y$	
1	\checkmark	res	\checkmark	res	\checkmark	res		res	\checkmark	res
2	\checkmark	res	\checkmark	res	\checkmark	res		res	\checkmark	res
3	\checkmark	res	\checkmark	res	\checkmark	res		res	\checkmark	res
4	\checkmark	res	\checkmark	res	\checkmark	res		res	\checkmark	res
5	\checkmark	res	\checkmark	res	\checkmark	res		res	\searrow	res
6	\checkmark	res	\checkmark	res	\mathbf{k}	res		res	\searrow	res
7	\checkmark	res	\checkmark	res	\checkmark	res		res	\checkmark	res
8	\checkmark	res	\checkmark	res	\checkmark	res		res	\checkmark	res
 10,000	\checkmark	res	\checkmark	res	\checkmark	res		res	\checkmark	res

	Pair ₁		Pair ₂		Pair ₃		• • •		Pair _n	
Iteration	$f_a f_b$		$f_c f_d$		$f_e^{} f_f^{}$		• • •		$f_x f_y$	
1	\checkmark	res	\checkmark	res	\checkmark	res		res	\checkmark	res
2	\checkmark	res	\checkmark	res	\checkmark	res		res	\checkmark	res
3	\checkmark	res	\checkmark	res	\checkmark	res		res	\checkmark	res
4	\searrow	res	\searrow	res	\checkmark	res		res	\checkmark	res
5	\sim	res	\searrow	res	\mathbf{k}	res		res	\mathbf{k}	res
6	\searrow	res	\rightarrow	res	\checkmark	res		res	\mathbf{X}	res
7	\sim	res	\searrow	res	\searrow	res		res	\searrow	res
8	\land	res	\mathbf{A}	res	\checkmark	res		res	\checkmark	res
 10,000	\checkmark	res	\checkmark	res	\checkmark	res		res	\checkmark	res



	Pair ₁	Pair ₂		Pair ₃		• • •		Pair _n	
Iteration	$f_a f_b$	$f_c f_d$		$f_e f_f$		•••		$f_x f_y$	
1		\sim	res	${\searrow}$	res		res	$\stackrel{\scriptstyle \leftarrow}{\rightarrow}$	res
2		\mathbf{A}	res	\sim	res		res	\mathbf{A}	res
3		\checkmark	res	\checkmark	res		res	\checkmark	res
4		\checkmark	res	\checkmark	res		res	\checkmark	res
5		\checkmark	res	\checkmark	res		res	\checkmark	res
6		\checkmark	res	\checkmark	res		res	\checkmark	res
7		\checkmark	res	\checkmark	res		res	\checkmark	res
8		\checkmark	res	\checkmark	res		res	\checkmark	res
 10,000		\checkmark	res	\checkmark	res		res	\checkmark	res



	Pair ₁	Pair ₂	Pair ₃	•••		Pair _n	
Iteration	$f_a f_b$	$f_{c} f_{d}$	$f_e f_f$	• • •		$f_x f_y$	
1			<u> </u>	res	res	\checkmark	res
2			· -	res	res	\checkmark	res
3			× -	res	res	\checkmark	res
4			× -	res	res	\checkmark	res
5			<u> </u>	res	res	\rightarrow	res
6			× -	res	res	${\sim}$	res
7			· -	res	res	\rightarrow	res
8			<u> </u>	res	res	\mathbf{A}	res
 10,000			∽ -	res	res	\checkmark	res
	100 60 60 60 60 60 60 61 61 61 61 61 62 61 62 61 62 61 62 61 62 63 64 63 63 64 63 64 63 64 63 64 63 64 63 64 63 64 63 64 63 64 64 63 64 64 63 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64	100 00 70 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 5					

	Pair ₁	Pair ₂	Pair ₃	•••		Pair _n	
Iteration	f _a f _b	$f_c f_d$	$f_e f_f$	• • •		$f_x f_y$	
1			\checkmark	res	res	res	
2				res	res		
3			\sim	res	res	res	
4			\mathbf{k}	res	res	res	
5			\sim .	res	res		
6			\sim .	res	res	res res	
7			\sim .	res	res	res	
8			\sim .	res	res	res	
 10 000			\checkmark	res	res	_res_	
10,000							•
	100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100	100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100	100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100	+	+	250 150 100 100 100 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0	

Pair ₁	Pair ₂	Pair ₃	•••	Pair _n
f _a f _b	$f_{c} f_{d}$	$f_e f_f$	• • •	$f_x f_y$









Final Model: Mains + Select Pairwise Interactions



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Final Model: Mains + Select Pairwise Interactions



Do's and Don'ts for EBMs

- Don't do feature selection --- first train EBM model on all available features
- Don't do feature engineering --- first train EBM model using raw features
- Don't impute missing values --- first train EBM model using unique codes for missing
- \cdot Do compare accuracy of EBM to other blackbox models such as DNN, GBT, and RF
- Do look at graphs --- there's gold (and secrets) hidden in those graphs
- Do detective work to understand anomalies --- data scientists + domain experts
- Do fix problems --- either edit graphs, clean data, or get new data
- Do compare graphs trained on this data to graphs from other data (other years, ...)